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FOREWORD
In a time of rapid change for the U.S. Army, it is essential to retain awareness of how potential adversaries are also developing their concepts of Landpower.
This Letort Paper, written by an influential Russian
general, lays out an authoritative view on the importance of substantial conventional land forces, as seen
from Moscow.
The year 2014 was an eventful one for the Russian
military, opening with the seizure of Crimea, continuing through ongoing operations in and near Ukraine,
and culminating with the issue of a new Military Doctrine reflecting what Russia describes as new security
realities in Europe. All of these circumstances have
drawn attention back to the challenge to U.S. interests
posed by the Russian military. The issue of this Paper
is therefore especially timely.
The author, Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy,
is a professor at the Russian General Staff Academy
with a substantial record of academic and operational
experience, and a direct contributor to the drafting
of Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine. An introduction to
General Rogovoy’s paper has been provided by noted
British scholar of the Russian military, Mr. Keir Giles.
This introduction provides essential context for the
piece, as well as highlighting key areas that will be
of particular interest to U.S. policymakers. Mr. Giles
explains some of the fundamental assumptions guiding Russian thought in this area. Some of these will
be familiar to U.S. military readers; others will be
unrecognizable.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present this unique insight into the thinking and assump-
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tions of the Russian military. It is recommended not
only to decisionmakers considering responses to a
newly assertive Russia, but also to planners developing the shape of the U.S. future land forces, and the
challenges they may face.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and ongoing operations in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on
the Russian military as a potential cause for concern
in Europe. This Letort Paper, by an influential Russian general and military academic, lays out specifically Russian views on the essential nature of strong
conventional land forces, and how they may be used.
With an expert commentary providing essential context and interpretation, the paper presents a valuable
insight into Russian military thinking, at a potentially
critical juncture for European security.
The author, Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy,
is a professor at the Russian General Staff Academy
with a substantial record of academic and operational
experience, including developing Russian doctrine on
the use of the Armed Forces beyond Russia’s borders.
The commentary has been provided by British expert
Keir Giles, who gives the context and background for
General Rogovoy’s paper, and highlights key areas of
importance to a Western readership.
Moscow continues to place primary importance
on conventional military force, with the direct intention of growing capability in order to challenge U.S.
power. While the United States and other Western
militaries are considering their future form after two
decades of focus on counterinsurgency, for Russia the
picture is different; strong emphasis on the enduring and central role of numerous conventional land
forces remains unchallenged. This paper should assist U.S. and Western planners and decisionmakers
by providing direct insight into resurgent Russia’s
military thinking.
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A RUSSIAN VIEW ON LANDPOWER
Keir Giles

For any state, the purpose of investing in military
power is to accomplish political goals. One of the basic
tenets of realism is that the larger and more skilled
the military, the more effectively the state can then deter the military power of another state and influence
political decisionmaking. But for over a decade, this
fundamental principle has been partially eclipsed for
the United States and its allies as a result of principal
threats arising from actors other than states. The result
of this shift in priority for the U.S. military, to address
the nonstate actor or terrorist threat, has been a calling
into question of the need for a large Landpower force
in times of stringent cuts to the military budget.
According to Janine Davidson, senior fellow for
defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations
and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
“the U.S. military is at a crossroads” as the rebalancing in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review envisages
a severe constriction in conventional ground forces,
including a planned 20 percent reduction in the active
component of the U.S. Army.1 Meanwhile, however,
competitors have continued to focus on direct military
competition with adversary states. It follows that the
strategic relevance of Landpower overall is not an assessment that the United States can make for itself, in
isolation from the strategic environment as perceived
by competitor nations with a distinctive land force
posture of their own.
Russia is the prime example. Operations in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine in early-2014 demonstrated the
results of processes that had been ongoing in the Russian military and in Russian security thinking for
1

almost a decade,2 as Moscow continues to place primary importance on conventional military force, with
the direct intention of growing capability in order to
challenge U.S. power.3 Russia’s new assertiveness,
backed up by at least the semblance of a capable landbased military, caused widespread surprise outside
a narrow expert community; but this should not lead
anyone to believe that this was a new departure.
President Vladimir Putin had made no secret of
driving change within Russia toward his ambition to
reassert Russian power through the tried and tested
means of military strength, as well as lip service to new
notions of soft power more suited to a post-nationalist
21st century Europe. This led to consistent startling
increases in military spending. These began not with
the current high-profile rearmament program that attracted widespread attention abroad, but immediately
when the Russian Federation first enjoyed a flow of
disposable income as a result of rising oil prices in
2004-05. Efforts began at that point to improve conventional military capability, to supplement the nuclear
deterrent that had been retained as an essential minimum guarantee of Russian sovereignty during the
preceding decade of chronic military underspending
and force reductions. Though the army is still much
in need of improvement, and the current transformation project still faces significant challenges, Russia
has proved both in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in
2014 that land force is a valid political tool to achieve
foreign policy goals.
Ukraine in particular is a shining example of how
the existence of a large land force can be effectively
combined with aspects of irregular warfare to achieve
these goals. Therefore, bold statements such as “there
is no doubt that irregular warfare campaigns will be
the norm rather than the exception in the future”4
2

should not be allowed to distract from the vital importance of maintaining sufficient land-based conventional force to act as a deterrent to behavior considered
unacceptable in the current world order.
This is not the first time that military thinkers have
predicted a growing marginalization and eventual irrelevance for Landpower. According to one review of
U.S. planning options:
When military aircraft gained widespread adoption
in the 1920s, a new breed of thinkers (or false prophets, depending on what military service you are from)
like General Billy Mitchell and General Giulio Douhet
claimed that there would be no more need for old
ground armies. Yet the need for “boots on the ground”
lived on throughout the 20th century—just as it will
live on into the 21st.5

It follows that conceptual approaches to deciding
on future military capability must not take place in
a planning vacuum, but needs to take account of the
very different views of other significant military actors, who may be less than willing to fall in with the
U.S. view of how military power ought to develop.
Views differ on the precise extent of improvements
in Russian military capability that result from the unprecedented program of transformation since 2008. In
this context, the distraction of operations in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine in early-2014 is unhelpful; there,
the main force Russian troops opposite the Ukrainian
border were for much of the conflict irrelevant, and
the special operations forces actually engaged should
not be taken as representative of the condition of the
Russian military overall.6 Direct, although unavowed,
involvement of Russian forces in combat in Ukraine
later in 2014 gives a more helpful but still imperfect
view of current capabilities.
3

Furthermore, transformation of the Russian armed
forces, and declarations on the new Russian way of
war—call it “hybrid,” “nonlinear,” “ambiguous,” or
any other of the recently coined epithets7—have done
little to shift assumptions in Moscow on the primacy
of nuclear or conventional brute force in safeguarding
Russia’s interests. Contrary to widespread assumptions, new approaches to achieving political aims
through the use of the military do not, in fact, mean a
new way for the Russian military as a whole to fight.8
Transformation of the Russian armed forces is intended to ensure that those forces can hold their own in
full-scale, high-intensity conflict, where a decisive role
will be played by land forces.
There is no shortage of Russian policy statements
and documents implying that a U.S. military presence in states neighboring Russia is a direct threat.
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010
was careful to describe the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) (and by extension, the United
States) as a “military danger” rather than a threat,
stipulating that it could become a direct threat if certain conditions were met.9 The response by NATO to
events in Ukraine arguably meets those conditions.
It is reasonable to expect that the new version of the
Military Doctrine, currently scheduled for release in
December 2014,10 will be markedly more hostile to the
United States, whether through the proxy of NATO
or directly. It should be ensured that plans to reduce
the role and relevance of land forces within the U.S.
military take this potential increase in hostility from a
major land power into account. Given all of the aforementioned, the importance of closely examining the
Russian view of the role of land forces in the modern
military should be clear.

4

This Paper lays out one such Russian view. It is
written by Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy, a professor at the Faculty of Military Art of the Russian
General Staff Academy with an extensive history of
both academic and operational service. His description of Russia’s transformation efforts, with their emphasis on creating high-tech, modern, agile forces,
will be familiar from other literature on the subject.
But it is the emphasis on the enduring and central role
of land forces that is of direct relevance here.
“Wars are fought for territory and resources. There
is only one way of defending these two things, and
that is the physical presence of ground forces,” Rogovoy believes. Therefore, “All Russian forces operate
solely in support of ground forces. They are not independent arms, merely facilitators.”11 This is sufficiently different from many Western assumptions that
specific passages from Rogovoy’s text should be given
closer attention. The following quotations are taken
from General Rogovoy's paper, the full text of which
can be found on page 17 onward.
The Russian Federation has found itself at the centre
of radical geopolitical change, and has become the
subject of increased interest and even territorial claims
from other countries.

The notion that other states have designs on Russian territory is taken as a given among a broad range
of senior Russian military and civilian officials. This
includes a long list of supposed territorial disputes
with Russia, some of which have long faded into history on the other side of the border. For example, a
briefing on “Threats to the Military Security of the
Russian Federation” given by former Chief of General
Staff Sergey Makarov to the Academy of Military Sci5

ences in early-2011 began with a map slide showing
these disputes along almost the entire European periphery of Russia—including such implausible ones as
Germany wishing to reclaim Kaliningrad, or Finland,
Karelia. The idea also includes the idée fixe that Russia
is a rich and desirable country, whose natural resources present a tempting target for potential invaders. In
effect, Russia projects its own history and principles
onto foreign partners who have not the slightest desire to march on Moscow.
This “increased interest” introduces a long list of
threats that the Russian military must counter. Many
of these seem innocuous or improbable—but it must
be remembered that they will be interpreted in Moscow in accordance with a Russian view of the world,
which contains a hostile, irresponsible and aggressive
NATO and United States. In this context, references to
“deployment of groups of forces and systems with a
view to launching a military attack on Russia or its allies,” “military exercises with provocative aims,” and
changes to “the current balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation” all refer, in Russian
eyes, to any enhancement of U.S. cooperation with
European partners.
A further threat that, in the Russian view, merits a
military response is “discrimination and the suppression of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of
Russian Federation citizens in foreign countries.” This
is by now a well-worn narrative in Russian motivations for aggressive action against neighbors, as demonstrated in both Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014,
as well as consistent pressure against the Baltic States
over the largely imaginary disadvantage notionally
suffered by Russian speakers there. The fact that even
if a problem did exist, use of military force to resolve it
would be entirely at odds with international relations
6

between developed countries, is encapsulated in the
“Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations” adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
and therefore endorsed by Russia, to govern precisely
this kind of situation—in effect explaining that it is not
Russia’s place to interfere.12
These are not the only descriptions of threats that
Rogovoy classes as meriting a military response contrary to all Western notions of what a country’s armed
forces are for. Among cross-border threats, he lists
“information activities hostile towards Russia and its
allies.” This is especially topical in the current state
of intense information warfare waged by Russia over
events in Ukraine, but the language is borrowed from
Russia’s Information Security Doctrine, and therefore
can be taken to extend to Russia’s long-held and deepseated suspicion of information transfer systems, including the Internet, and in particular social media.
The consequences of conceptual mismatches between
Russia and its neighbors such as these are that very
close attention needs to be paid to precisely what
Russia considers to be hostile action, which demands
counteraction using military force.
Peacekeeping has become a priority in the activities of
the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It is a powerful tool in Russian foreign policy. The use of Russian
troops in peacekeeping operations is one of the ways
to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation and ensure its security.13

It is essential to note that translating the Russian
word used here—mirotvorcheskiy—as “peacekeeping,” while accepted as a standard translation, risks
giving entirely the wrong impression of what Russia
7

intends for these troops. The Russian word is closer to
“peace creation,” and envisages a far more assertive
and violent role than the Western concept of maintaining a peace that has already been achieved. After all,
the Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 was referred
to as an “operation to enforce peace on Georgia.” In
early-2014, foreign defense attachés in Moscow were
treated to a demonstration of Russian “peacekeeping”
training, and reported that instead of training in winning hearts and minds, what they saw was in effect
an all-out high-intensity assault, with air support, on
the location where peace was supposedly to be created.14 Russian peacekeeping troops have also been
created for overt political roles. In Rogovoy’s words,
Russia needs peacekeeping forces “because that’s the
only way you can move troops across another country’s borders with a band playing and with everybody
pleased to see them.”15
Russia also has an entirely different attitude both
to nuclear weapons, and to the prospect of their use,
as alluded to in Rogovoy’s note that “preserving the
potential of the strategic deterrent forces” is the prime
task of the Russian military. This theme has been explored in detail in a recent Strategic Studies Institute
paper.16 Another very distinctly Russian theme within
the text is the reference to World War II (or the Great
Patriotic War) as a relevant benchmark for modern
force development.
But the main thrust of the Paper is to emphasize
the centrality of Landpower to ensuring Russian
national security:
Given the vastness of Russia and the length of its land
borders, it is obvious that it is simply impossible to
safeguard the defence capability of the Russian state
without extensive use of the Land Forces.
8

Yes, they do it in cooperation with other armed services and service arms of the armed forces, but other
armed services and branches of the armed forces tend
to act in the interests of the Land Forces.
Some military theorists (mostly supporters of the idea
of so-called “contactless wars”), who do not properly
evaluate the trends outlined above, have begun increasingly to claim a reduction in the role of the Land
Forces, which, in their opinion, will in the wars of the
future decide only auxiliary tasks. In my view, these
assertions are absolutely groundless.17

In this context, Rogovoy refers to experience in
Chechnya (referred to in the official Russian formulation of “the antiterrorist operation in the North Caucasus”) and Georgia (“the operation to enforce peace”)
to show that missile and air strikes can achieve a political aim by compelling an adversary to make concessions, but only the land forces can actually control territory, and therefore it is these which are essential in
subduing opponents.
Rogovoy also highlights Russia’s program to
improve its capability of using long-range weapons:
against the enemy in a way that does not require it
to be engaged in close-in combat. They are missile
systems, air defence missile systems, multiple-launch
rocket systems, long-range artillery guns that can fire
precision-guided munitions . . .18

This section is of particular topicality when considering cross-border influence and stand-off strikes and
bombardments against Ukraine during mid-2014, in
the absence of any overt incursion.

9

In an appendix entitled “Views of Foreign Military
Analysts,” Rogovoy holds a mirror to U.S. re-evaluations of the role of land forces, and of the threats that
the U.S. Army must counter. The result is a fascinating “view from the side” on the current debate over
force restructuring. It can be assumed that Rogovoy’s
views and assumptions are not that far removed from
those of his colleagues developing specific plans relating to U.S. military power. As such, the appendix
should also be examined closely, since it is indicative
of how the U.S. debate, and its likely results, may be
perceived by these planners.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
If the trajectory of increasing Russian budget and
capability, and decreases in the budget and capability of European militaries, continue indefinitely, then
obviously the two trends will eventually intersect and
Russia will have achieved its goal of overmatching
modern Western militaries. But Russia does not have
to wait that long. A combination of the political will
to use force, and a variety of other tools at Russia’s
disposal to influence target states, serve as force multipliers in Russian security calculus. It follows that in
order to feel confident enough to mount a challenge to
the United States, Russia does not need a large, powerful, modern force equivalent to that of the United
States in every aspect of capability.
Russia under President Putin has shown, both
in Syria and Ukraine, that only small and tangential
amounts of actual applied military force are needed
to accomplish their political goals. In Syria, the primary goal of preventing a U.S. military intervention
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and regime change was achieved by a mix of hard,
persistent diplomatic efforts and support for the Asad
regime with money, weapons, and political protection in the United Nations (UN). In Ukraine, Moscow startled the world by moving mass amounts of
its land forces quickly and effectively to the border
with Ukraine. But in the early stages of the conflict,
the main role of those forces was then to sit on the
border, augmenting and depleting as required in
order to focus the attention of the West like a hypnotist’s watch, while only small groups of Russian
special operations forces actually conducted warfare
inside Ukraine. And yet, Putin is still accomplishing
his goals: undermining the Petro Poroshenko government, keeping Ukraine within the Russian sphere of
influence, portraying Russia to the domestic audience
as a strong power successfully deterring U.S. ambition, and last but not least, sending a strong message to other states in Russia’s vicinity not to step out
of line.
At the same time, Ukraine also demonstrates another key facet of current Russian military policy; that
of faking it till you make it. Some Western analysts are
prone to the error of confusing Russian ability to conduct large-scale military exercises with an ability to
actually wage large-scale war, with little assessment
of how and whether those exercises actually result in
improved combat capability. Russian military transformation remains a work in progress, and further capability improvements are to be expected. But in the
meantime, the progress of the campaigns in Ukraine
and Crimea show that Russia is already willing to
make use of those parts of its land forces that have
already reached an acceptable level of capability, even
as the broad mass of those forces is still under par.

11

According to one view, the primary benefit accruing to Russia from the recent large scale exercises,
over and above practicing the actual movement of
troops, is propaganda and intimidation. This tallies with the role of the Russian troops opposite the
border with eastern Ukraine, who initially facilitated
Russian objectives simply by being there as a potential problem, rather than by actually doing anything.
But the development path of Russian military capability overall has been clear for some time, and greater
parts of that military will be considered ready for use
as time passes. Two responses to this situation are essential; first, proper investment in the analytical capability to watch, understand, and predict Russia (and
proper attention paid to the results of that analysis);
and second, ensuring that land forces do not become
sufficiently hollowed out to tip the balance of Russian
security calculations in favor of challenging them.
The United States does not, as yet, suffer from
the deficiencies in analytical capacity on Russia that
plague partner nations such as the United Kingdom
(UK).19 Nonetheless, the degree of surprise which appears to have overtaken the United States not only at
operations in Crimea, but at the Russian military’s
new capabilities as demonstrated in exercises throughout 2013, argues that the conclusions reached by that
capacity are either flawed, or correct but not being
passed high enough up the intelligence food chain to
reach decisionmakers. The paths that led to the current
condition and use of Russian Landpower were both
long and well-signposted. This allowed scholars, even
at the dawn of the Putin era, to place essential caveats on the development of relations with Russia,20 and
more recently, for warnings to be issued in 2013 on

12

the implications for Russia’s neighbors of Moscow’s
development of its new military tool.21 The manner
in which Russia defends its perceived interests is sufficiently well-known, and Moscow’s declaratory policy sufficiently pellucid, that after Georgia and now
Ukraine, some form of Russian military intervention
against NATO member states in the future should no
longer be automatically discounted by forecasters.
There is no doubt irregular warfare has become a
principal method of conflict in the 21st century. However, this should not lead to a reduced emphasis on the
primary importance of maintaining sufficient conventional Landpower. As put in one Australian review:
It may be that, in some cases, the pendulum has
swung too far in favour of irregular warfare in terms
of training and the development of concepts of operations. . . . A large military has the inherent capacity to
train a certain part of the force to cater for the irregular
aspects in the conduct of conflict while continuing to
maintain a majority of the force oriented towards its
raison d’être—the defence of the sovereignty of the nation against any and all attacks.22

A reduced size and capability of U.S. Landpower
to respond to large conventional military threats inevitably reduces the risk element in another nation’s
calculus when considering using military force to
achieve its political goals, thereby making this option
more attractive. While a conventional land force attack on U.S. territory seems entirely unlikely, NATO
nations are acutely aware that infringements of their
sovereignty become increasingly probable as Russia
continues its campaign of assertiveness in Eastern
Europe. The result is that:
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There is an acknowledged need for armed forces within NATO and partner nations to change focus from
insurgency-related operations back to more classic
forms of state on state warfare. Land warfare tactics
and operational art against modern but more traditional large scale troop formations need to be developed and trained.23

Regardless of the reluctance of some NATO allies
to take an interest in funding their own defense, if the
United States is to continue to safeguard its vital interests in Europe, it is essential to pay continued close attention to conventional Landpower. This is necessary
to ensure the flexibility not only to respond to further
highly likely adverse developments in European security, but also globally wherever the United States
has interests and friends with land borders. In short,
being prepared for irregular warfare is important,
but maintaining sufficient Landpower to deter adversaries effectively is essential.
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DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR
LAND FORCES
Major General Aleksandr V. Rogovoy
The current stage of international development is
characterized by acute socioeconomic conflicts and
political differences. At the beginning of the 21st century, emerging processes suggest that the role that
military force plays as the nations of the world seek
to safeguard their political and economic interests is
becoming greater. This means that a whole range of issues to do with both the main aspects of international
security and the principles of the Russian Federation’s
national security have to be rethought.
In the third millennium, the Russian Federation
has found itself at the center of radical geopolitical
change and has become the subject of increased interest and even territorial claims from other countries.
Russia’s transformation into a strong economic and
military power able to defend its own national interests independently is not to the taste of some countries, which remain committed to resolving various
conflicts through the use of military force in breach of
the rules of international law. Consequently, Russia’s
military security will be of crucial importance in the
21st century, too.
What is understood by military security is where
society, the state, and its citizens are secure against external and internal threats associated with the use of
military force or the threat of its use. Military security
is the most important ingredient of Russia’s national
security. It is determined by the political situation of
the country and the level of its defense capability. Military security presupposes that military threats and the
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dynamics of their development must be ascertained.
The Russian Federation Law “On Security” gives the
following definition of “threats”: “a set of conditions
and factors that endanger the vital interests of the
individual, society and state.”1
Military force still plays a major role in the achievement of political goals by states and blocs of states:
•	the range of conditions under which military
force is used is expanding. The threat of nuclear
and conventional large-scale war has receded
somewhat, while at the same time the number
of risks associated with the emergence of lowintensity armed conflicts has increased;
•	new centers of economic and political power
are emerging, and geopolitical competition
for the redivision of spheres of influence is
intensifying;
•	the geographical expanse, which is potentially
fraught with crisis, remains in place and is expanding (the Balkans, the Caucasus, Middle,
Central and South Asia, and the Near and
Middle East), the level of regional conflict potential in it on the basis of ethnicity, religion or
crime is increasing, the trend is that the arms
race is being renewed, and the danger of proliferation in precision-guided, conventional,
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery exists in different
regions; and,
•	
previous international and regional security
mechanisms are losing their earlier effectiveness and cannot adequately respond to the rapidly changing strategic situation.
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Analysis of the current global military-political
situation in the world suggests that the starting point
in assessing the level of military threat to Russia is
that the role of military force in international relations in recent years has not diminished. Moreover,
the military-political situation does not exclude the
possibility that major armed conflicts affecting the security interests of the Russian Federation might arise
near Russia’s borders, or that a direct military threat
to Russia’s security might occur. National, including
fundamental national interests, may be affected by a
diverse range of threats that emerge as a result of particular developments in the military-political situation
and that may take different forms, such as political,
military-political, or the use of force. It can be said that
in the current international situation, there are three
types of threats to neutralize, which are to some extent
a function of the Russian Federation Armed Forces:
external, internal and cross-border. The main external
military threats must include:
•	deployment of groups of forces and systems
with a view to launching a military attack on
Russia or its allies;
•	
territorial claims against Russia, and the
threat of political or military annexation of her
territories;
•	the pursuit by states, organizations and movements of programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction;
•	interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation by foreign states or by organizations supported by foreign states;
•	demonstrations of military force near Russia’s
borders, and military exercises with provocative aims;
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•	the existence near the borders of the Russian
Federation or the borders of its allies of epicenters of armed conflict that threaten its security;
•	instability and weak state institutions in border
countries;
•	build-ups of troops in a way that upsets the
current balance of forces near the borders of the
Russian Federation or the borders of its allies
and their adjacent territorial waters;
•	expansion of military blocs and alliances to the
detriment of the military security of the Russian Federation or its allies;
•	
the activities of international radical groups
and the strengthening of Islamic extremism
near the Russian border;
•	deployment of foreign troops (without the consent of the Russian Federation and approval
of the UN Security Council) in the territory of
countries adjacent and friendly to the Russian
Federation;
•	armed provocations, including attacks on the
Russian Federation’s military facilities located
on the territory of foreign states, as well as facilities and installations on the state border of
the Russian Federation or the borders of its
allies;
•	action to prevent the work of Russian state and
military control systems, the functioning of the
strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning,
missile defense, space surveillance, and the
combat sustainability of forces;
•	actions that impede Russia’s access to strategically important transport communications;
•	discrimination and the suppression of rights,
freedoms, and legitimate interests of Russian
Federation citizens in foreign countries; and,
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•	proliferation of equipment, technologies, and
components used in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as dual-use technologies that can
be used to create weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery.
The main internal military threats must include:
•	attempts to change the constitutional order and
the territorial integrity of Russia by force;
•	planning, preparation, and implementation of
actions to disrupt and disorganize the functioning of the institutions of state power and
government, and attacks on vital government,
economic, and military sites and information
infrastructure;
•	forming, equipping, training, and running of illegal armed groups;
•	illegal distribution and circulation of weapons,
ammunition, and explosives in the territory of
the Russian Federation;
•	large-scale organized criminal activities threatening political stability on the scale of a constituent part of the Russian Federation; and,
•	the activities of separatist and radical religious
and nationalist movements in the Russian
Federation.
In recent times, cross-border threats have become
more and more important for the military security
of states. They include political, military-political, or
use-of-force threats to the interests and security of the
Russian Federation, which combine the features of
both internal and external threats, and which, being
of an internal nature in the forms they take, are in es-
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sence external (in the sources of origin and initiation,
possible participants, and so on). The significance of
cross-border threats to the military security of the
Russian Federation will have a tendency to increase.
Such threats can include:
•	creating, equipping, supporting, and training
in other countries of armed groups with a view
to transferring their activities to the territory of
the Russian Federation or the territories of its
allies;
•	the subversive activities of separatist, ethnic,
or religious extremist groups, directly or indirectly aimed at undermining the constitutional
order in Russia, creating a threat to its territorial integrity and to the security of its citizens;
•	cross-border crime, including smuggling and
other illegal activities, on a scale threatening
the military-political security of the Russian
Federation or stability on the territory of its
allies;
•	
information activities hostile towards Russia
and its allies;
•	the activities of international terrorist organizations; and,
•	drug trafficking posing a threat that drugs
might be trafficked to the territory of Russia
or that its territory might be used as that of
a transit country for drug trafficking to other
countries.
Today, the level of military threat to Russia’s security can be regarded as relatively low. None of the
existing conflicts involving the use of force creates a
direct military threat to its security. At the same time,
in view of changes in the global geopolitical situation
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in the world, we have to admit that to ensure Russia’s
security only through political opportunities (membership in international organizations, partnerships,
opportunities to influence) is becoming impossible.
Thus, to ensure military security, it is important to determine the nature of dangers and threats to national
interests. This is the defining factor for the planning
of organizational development of the military with
military security in mind, since the exaggeration of
threats leads to resources being unjustifiably diverted
from other national priorities, while their understatement leads to distortions in military development and
major errors that cannot be quickly remedied in a crisis situation. To ensure national security, a variety of
methods, techniques, and tools can be used. Military
force, however, still has a special place among them.
It is the task of the armed forces to neutralize external
threats, with internal and cross-border threats as part
of it, that is put into practice in cooperation with other
security structures and the appropriate authorities of
the Russian Federation’s allies. The Russian armed
forces perform their tasks in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws of the
Russian Federation in relation to defense and security,
other state regulatory acts, and Russia’s international
commitments in strict compliance with international
law. The main tasks of the armed forces in relation to
the military security of the country include:
•	strategic, mainly nuclear, deterrence of potential aggressors to deter them from waging war
against Russia and its allies;
•	if necessary, to back up the political actions of
the state with the demonstration of force or a
naval presence;
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•	reliable protection and defense of the state border of the Russian Federation, and to prevent
the infiltration of its territory by armed groups;
•	to maintain the composition and condition of
the nuclear forces at a level that ensures the inevitability of nuclear retaliation against the aggressor in any situation; and,
•	localization and neutralization of armed border conflicts by permanent-readiness troops
(forces), and, in the event of an escalation, with
the implementation of full or partial strategic
deployment by the armed forces to repel the
act of aggression and achieve the nominated
military-political and military-strategic goals.
In today’s environment, the objectives of the armed
forces in the system of security in the Russian Federation are not limited just to matters of national defense.
The need to use military force requires a broader
framework. Peacekeeping has become a priority in the
activities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It is
a powerful tool in Russian foreign policy. The use of
Russian troops in peacekeeping operations is one of
the ways to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation and ensure its security. Modern Russian military planning, based on a realistic assessment
of the Russian Federation’s current resources and
capabilities, assumes that the Russian armed forces
must be able to:
•	in peacetime and in emergencies, while maintaining strategic deterrence potential and fulfilling the tasks of maintaining combat readiness
without additional mobilization activities, successfully accomplish missions simultaneously
in two armed conflicts of any type, as well as
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mount peacekeeping operations, both independently and as part of multinational forces;
•	in the event of an escalation in the military-political and military-strategic situation, ensure
strategic deployment of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces and deter the escalation of the
situation, through the strategic deterrence forces and the deployment of permanent-readiness
forces; and,
•	in wartime, with the available forces, defend
against enemy aerospace attack and, following full-scale strategic deployment, be able to
accomplish missions simultaneously in two
local wars.
Proceeding from the tasks related to the ensuring
of the Russian Federation’s military security, the military-political leadership of the country has identified
priorities for reform and strengthening of its armed
forces now and in the foreseeable future. The main
ones are:
•	preserving the potential of the strategic deterrent forces;
•	increasing the number of permanent-readiness
formations and units, and forming force groupings on their basis;
•	
improving operational (combat) training of
troops (forces);
•	improving the system of manning the armed
forces;
•	implementing a program for the modernization of arms, military, and special equipment,
and maintaining them in a combat-ready state;
•	improving military science and education; and,
•	improving the systems of indoctrination and
moral and psychological training.
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Currently, Russia is taking specific measures to
modernize the armed forces. Its major focus is to maintain the strategic nuclear forces at a level that ensures
guaranteed deterrence of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. Over the next 5 years,
the plan is to increase significantly the degree to which
the strategic nuclear forces are equipped with modern
long-range aircraft, submarines and strategic missile
troop launchers. Today, successful work is already
underway to develop unique high-precision weapons
systems and maneuverable warheads that have a trajectory that is unpredictable (so far as the potential adversary is concerned). Along with effective means to
breach missile defenses, the new types of weapons allow what is one of the most important guarantees for
lasting peace to be preserved—a strategic balance of
forces. As part of the general-purpose forces, around
600 permanent-readiness units and formations have
been mustered by 2013. In case of need, mobile and
self-sufficient groups that will be underpinned by
professionally trained permanent-readiness units and
formations from the land forces can be quickly set up
in any potentially dangerous sector.
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of funds allocated for the
development of the army and navy, over expenditure
intended for their upkeep. All the measures towards
the modernization of the armed forces being taken
now and to be taken in the future should ultimately
provide the Russian Federation with a capability adequately to respond to modern-day military threats to
its security, guarantee protection against these threats
and ensure territorial integrity.
Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions
can be drawn:
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1. Military security is one of the special types of
security; and,
2. To ensure military security, it is necessary to
have modern armed forces, and to form an effective
system of collective security or global security.
The land forces play an important and often decisive role in the protection of the state. Has their
present-day importance changed, given that the trend
is towards an increase in the proportion of aerospace
forces and systems? Indeed, the military role of aerospace has increased significantly over the past decade
through the use of high-tech systems, especially for
reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and
long-range firepower. In the future, this trend will
only grow.
It has to be said that the land forces have always
played a vital role in the maintenance of Russia’s
military security and in the defense of its national interests. Russian military strategy, based on the fundamental assumption that victory can be achieved only
through the joint efforts of all the services in the armed
forces, ensured during the Great Patriotic War (World
War II) that the strengths of each of them were put
to the best possible use. However, since the hostilities
with Nazi Germany took place primarily on land and
the outcome of the war was decided in land battles,
the main role in the warfare against an experienced,
well-trained enemy army belonged to the land forces,
which were the basis of the armed forces of the United
Soviet Socialist Republics. During the war, their share
in the battle strength of the armed forces ranged from
80 to 86 percent, while their total numerical strength
at the beginning of 1945 increased by a factor of 2.2
compared to June 1941. Accordingly, the land forces
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constituted the basis of strategic groupings and tackled all the major objectives assigned to the Red Army.
Meanwhile, the groups of forces in the other armed
services of the armed forces were used and operated
mainly in support.
In the prewar years, Russian military science
achieved considerable success in the development of
military theory. This contributed to the fact that, during the war, the land forces, in conjunction with the
other armed services of the armed forces and on the
basis of the best theory of the deep offensive, prepared
and brilliantly executed more than 50 operations by
groups of fronts, around 250 front operations and
multiple army ones.
The Great Patriotic War is rightly considered a
“war of engines,” so the success of the land forces in
the decisive battles was largely due to the quantity
and quality of the weapons and military equipment
supplied to them. The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that, even under extremely difficult
wartime conditions, all the problems and challenges
in the building and development of the land forces can
be successfully solved. This requires a clear program
of action, deliberate concentration of financial and
logistical resources in key sectors, firm control over
the process of reform, and efficient operation of the
military-industrial complex. When these conditions
are met, one can also expect success at this stage of the
transformations aimed at the construction of modern
land forces able to respond adequately to the threats
and challenges of the 21st century.
In the years after World War II, the land forces
were formally established as an armed service in the
armed forces, when the Main Command of the land
forces was created in 1946. Their subsequent develop-
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ment was influenced by scientific and technological
progress, which ensured that effective weapons and
military equipment were developed to meet the ever
greater demands of war. This enabled the land forces
successfully to accomplish any missions to ensure the
military security of our country.
However, the indisputable fact is that the earth’s
surface remains the main sphere of human activity today and will remain so in the foreseeable future, and
military conflicts arise as a rule because of “earthly”
problems: territorial disputes, striving to gain control over natural resources, redistribution of spheres
of influence, or political, ideological, religious, and
other differences. Given the vastness of Russia and
the length of its land borders, it is obvious that it is
simply impossible to safeguard the defense capability
of the Russian state without extensive use of the land
forces. They are a versatile and multifunctional armed
service of the armed forces; their military formations
are able to take control of areas and lines of defense
and hold them for a long time in order to consolidate
definitively their success.
The total length of the Russian Federation’s borders is 60,932 km. Of these, 22,125 km are on land (including 7,616 km of lakes and rivers) and 38,807 km
(about two-thirds) are at sea.
After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), Russia has the following types of
borders:
1. Old frontiers coincide with the frontiers of the
former USSR (inherited from the USSR), most of which
are fixed by international treaty:
• borders with states of the far abroad (Norway, Finland, Poland, China, Mongolia, and
North Korea).
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Map 1. Russian Territorial Borders.
2. New borders with the near abroad:
• former administrative boundaries formalized
as state borders with the Commonwealth
of Independent States countries (the border
with Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia,
and Azerbaijan); and,
• the borders with the Baltic countries (Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania).
3. The northern and eastern borders of Russia are
maritime (12 nautical miles).
4. The western and southern borders are mainly
over land. The great length of Russia’s state borders
is the result of the size of its territory and the winding outline of the coastlines of the Arctic, Pacific, and
Atlantic Oceans that surround its shores.
5. Maritime borders of Russia border 12
countries.
6. The longest sea border (19,724.1 kilometers
[km]) runs along the coast of the Arctic Ocean; the
longest land border is with Kazakhstan, 7,591-km.
30

This country, with 60,000-km of land borders and
surrounded on three sides by seas and oceans, must in
addition to the four operational-strategic commands
have the fifth, mobile operational-strategic command,
which will enable it to give an all-sided response to
threats and challenges both within the country and
abroad. That is to say, as “territorial presence” forces,
the land forces, in the present conditions too, continue
to play a decisive role in the defeat of the enemy and
the achievement of the objectives of military action.
Yes, they do it in cooperation with other armed services and service arms of the armed forces, but other
armed services and branches of the armed forces tend
to act in the interests of the land forces.
Unfortunately, during the crisis of the 1990s, the
capabilities of the land forces decreased somewhat,
which was caused not only by a considerable reduction in their numerical strength, but also a substantial
reduction in the rate at which modern weapons and
military equipment were developed and supplied to
the troops. It was at the same time that new trends
in the changing nature and substance of warfare began to emerge, which were dictated by the increasing
effectiveness of conventional weapons as well as the
command and control and operational and combat
support systems that were coming into service in the
armies of the world’s most developed nations.
First, precision-guided weapons and munitions
based on artificial intelligence, as well as robotic systems and weapons whose operation is based on new
physical principles, have been used more and more
widely in the course of military operations. For example, during the war in Iraq (2003), the total number
of guided munitions that were used to attack ground
and air targets exceeded 15,000 rounds, which ac-
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counted for 70 percent of the total. Compare that to
the war against Iraq in 1991, when this figure was 9
percent; against Yugoslavia (1999), when it was 35
percent; and in Afghanistan (2001), where the figure
was 69 percent.
Second, the proportion of aerospace forces and
systems has increased, and conventional strategic
weapons have come into play as the main weapon of
war, providing direct strategic results. Thus, during
the war against Iraq (2003), the United States used a
constellation of 50-59 military satellites, 28 global positioning system satellites and a large number of commercial satellite communications and remote earthsensing satellites in orbit. More than 1,000 combat
aircraft were used to deliver massive air strikes. From
March 20 to April 10, 2003, alone, they flew some
33,000 combat sorties, including 15,000 in support of
the coalition forces’ ground operation that followed.
Third, the spatial characteristics of warfare have
expanded, since the increasing reach of current and future weapons allows powerful strikes to be delivered
over the entire depth of the warring states’ territory,
with targets being hit not only consecutively but also
simultaneously, which means that any region of the
world may become a theatre of operations. All clashes
and battles thus become dispersed, voluminous in nature, and cover warfare over all its dimensions; front,
depth, and height.
Fourth, even greater importance in the wars of
the 21st century has been accorded to the information component of warfare. This is because the troops
are equipped with highly effective weapons systems
based on the extensive use of information technology,
as well as high-performance reconnaissance, communications, navigation, automated command and
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control, electronic warfare, and other systems. In this
context, achieving information superiority over the
enemy becomes one of the basic conditions for the
success of military operations. The role of information
warfare in future wars increases accordingly.
Fifth, the temporal parameters of warfare have
become “compressed” because of an increase in the
rapidity of hostilities due to the fact that the collection,
processing, and use of information about the enemy
and the friendly troops is carried out in real or nearreal time. The initial period of the wars of the future
could become the main and decisive one, as the initiator of the war (the aggressor), especially one having
technological superiority, will seek, with lightning
speed and as soon as possible, to achieve its militarypolitical objectives.
Sixth, highly maneuverable, mobile action by the
troops with the use of all spheres of warfare and the
need to preempt the enemy in combat (operations)
dictate the transition from strictly vertical command
and control linkages to global network-based automated command and control and weapons systems.
This kind of transition involves setting up a unified
information-exchange network linking decisionmakers and forces that ensures the necessary information
about the situation is quickly brought to the attention
of combatants, both superior and subordinate command and control agencies and neighbors on a “manyto-many” basis. In practice, the process of command
and control over forces and systems is accelerated.
The tempo of operations, the effectiveness with which
the enemy is engaged, the survivability of the friendly
forces, and the level of self-synchronization during
warfare are also increased.
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It should be noted that some military theorists
(mostly supporters of the idea of so-called “contactless wars”) who do not properly evaluate the trends
outlined earlier increasingly have begun to claim a
reduction in the role of the land forces, which, in their
opinion, will in the wars of the future decide only
auxiliary tasks. In my view, these assertions are absolutely groundless. Of course, if the purpose of military
action is to force the government of the opponent to
accept an externally imposed political solution, as was
the case, for example, in Iraq (1991) and Yugoslavia
(1999), its achievement will sometimes be possible if
it is limited to massive missile and air strikes, even
then provided that government has no answer to it:
no modern aviation, air defenses, means for delivering powerful retaliatory strikes and so on.
But when the task is to seize or retake territory
captured by the enemy or to repel a ground invasion
by superior enemy forces, the land forces will have a
decisive role. After all, the land forces have been and
still are the only means to hold and control territory.
No wonder they say that no territory can be considered conquered or liberated when no soldier has set
foot on it. This was eloquently demonstrated by the
experience of the antiterrorist operation in the North
Caucasus and the operation to compel Georgia to
make peace, during which it was simply impossible
to achieve goals only through missile and air strikes,
without immediate, active, and decisive action by the
land forces. Certainly, in the course of modern wars
and armed conflicts, there will occur independent,
quite long stages in the warfare between the sides, the
main focus of which will be to deliver preemptive, retaliatory, or launch-on-warning massive missile and
air strikes and to wage electronic and other types of
warfare over the entire depth of the enemy’s territory.
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The land forces, however, will take a very active
part in this, as they also are armed with long-range
high-precision weapons effective against the enemy in
a way that does not require it to be engaged in close-in
combat. They are missile systems, air defense missile
systems, multiple-launch rocket systems, long-range
artillery guns that can fire precision-guided munitions,
anti-tank guided missiles, and electronic warfare systems, the quantity of which in the nomenclature of armament in the land forces has been growing steadily.
Therefore, this is not about the reduction of the role of
the land forces in modern warfare, but about the need
to increase the share of advanced high-performance
long-range high-precision weapons and “smart weapons” in the nomenclature of their armament, and that
is one of the priorities in their development at this
stage. The fact that the role of the land forces has not
been reduced is in particular borne out by the new
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which defines the main tasks of the armed forces in relation to
the military security of the state. Analysis shows that
success in the accomplishment of the vast majority of
them can be achieved with the dominant role of the
land forces. First and foremost, this is:
•	protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation;
•	
containment and prevention of military
conflicts;
•	preparation and conduct of operations to repel
an enemy ground invasion, defeat the troops
or forces of the aggressor, and force it to cease
hostilities on favorable terms;
•	
prevention, containment, and resolution of
cross-border and internal armed conflicts;
• the fight against terrorism;
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•	maintenance of martial law or state of emergency; preparation and conduct of territorial
defense;
•	forming up, preparing and dispatching strategic reserves to their destination;
• support for strategic regroupings of troops;
• replacement of losses;
•	security and peacekeeping operations (or operations to restore peace/security); and,
•	measures to prevent or eliminate a threat to
peace, suppression of acts of aggression, or
breach of peace on the basis of United Nations
Security Council resolutions, and many others.
Besides this, the military formations of the Russian
land forces now constitute the basis of the Collective
Rapid Reaction Forces, established under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and are always on
standby to honor Russia’s allied commitments in accordance with international treaties. Therefore, we are
convinced that in the foreseeable future the land forces will retain a key role in ensuring Russia’s military
security, as their military formations will continue to
form the basis of groups of troops and forces in strategic sectors. In these cases, the structure, equipment
and level of training of the land forces must ensure
their capability to conduct successfully active warfare under any scenario for the outbreak of wars and
armed conflicts with any possible adversary, be it the
regular army of one of the world’s most developed
nations or irregular forces from international terrorist
organizations.
In order for the land forces fully to suit their purpose, as well as for them to be able to deal with the
trends that emerge in the changing nature and content
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of warfare in the long term, a wide range of activities
are currently under way aimed at their construction
and development. The aim of these transformations
is to create fundamentally new highly mobile formations, military units, and command and control agencies in an efficient structure of organization and establishment, equipped with modern weapons, military
and special equipment, highly field-trained and able,
in collaboration with the forces and formations of
other armed services and service arms in the Russian
Federation armed forces, to guarantee the accomplishment of the mission to ensure the military security of
the state.
To date, much has already been done, particularly
concerning improving the structure of the land forces:
•	
permanent-readiness brigades have replaced
divisions;
•	
a more streamlined three-tier command and
control system (military district, operational
command, brigade) has been adopted;
•	the network of military educational institutions
has been optimized;
•	a mixed system of manning (contract personnel
and conscripts) has been adopted; and,
•	the training of professional noncommissioned
officers has been organized.
Much is still being done, especially regarding the
re-equipment of the land forces’ formations and units
with modern models of weapons, military, and special equipment as part of the State Armaments Program for 2011-20, the training of personnel to operate them, improving the processes of command and
control as a unified automated command and control
system for the troops and weapons at the tactical level
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enters service, raising the effectiveness and quality of
combat training, and the search for advanced forms
and methods of warfare.
The most important focus is now on the development of an operational and tactical-level reconnaissance system, providing a comprehensive view of
the entire zone of imminent hostilities over the entire
combat-mission depth (within weapons range) in any
situation using intelligence from space and air reconnaissance systems. The main way to increase the effectiveness of reconnaissance is, in our opinion, for
the combined-arms formations to be equipped with
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems. They must
be highly survivable, mobile, multifunctional, capable
of helicopter-like flight patterns (vertical takeoff and
landing, hover), and of day-and-night and all-weather
use from unprepared sites or directly from the transporter vehicle. Meanwhile, the equipment mounted
on a UAV must enable the necessary information
about the enemy to be obtained quickly, in real-time
or near-real-time, with the indication of the exact coordinates of targets in the dynamic, rapidly changing
environment of modern combined-arms combat. The
effectiveness of UAV use can be maximized if they
are on the combat strength of combined-arms formations in the land forces (formations in the service
arms and special troops of the land forces). As they
independently control the UAV, combined-arms commanders can bypass intermediate instances to obtain
the intelligence they need directly from it and quickly
put it to use in order to achieve their combat objectives. Another important aspect is to build an effective
command and control system on the basis primarily
of a unified automated command and control system
for the tactical level to integrate the functions of com-
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mand, control, reconnaissance, communications and
navigation. Its implementation should improve the
combat effectiveness of the formations and units by
not less than 50 percent, as the complete information
picture of the battlefield is formed for the appropriate
commanders in real time, as the command and control cycle is shortened by a factor of two to three, and
the level of automation is brought to that of a single
soldier or weapon.
It is impossible to improve the effectiveness of
the command and control system without improving communications, to make them high-speed, highbandwidth, stable, reliable and secure. These kinds of
systems should be designed based on digital signal
processing techniques using modern technology. In
the process, it is important to achieve a significant increase in uptime and reduce the weight and size of radio systems, as well as to develop them with possible
interservice application in mind. Navigation support
of warfare is equally important in the present-day environment. It should be developed both based on the
earliest introduction of the GLONASS (global navigation satellite) system and the provision of the land
forces with associated onboard and wearable receivers, and through the development of other reliable
autonomous sources that can highly accurately determine the current location of objects.
It is impossible to counter the enemy as it organizes command and control and the interaction of its firepower and reconnaissance assets in a single information and telecommunications environment, without
widespread use of electronic warfare. The main focus
in this aspect should be on the development of operational and tactical-level systems that provide for the
guaranteed accomplishment of objectives such as the
jamming of enemy reconnaissance and target indica39

tion radar systems, both ground-based and air-based,
and its latest digital communications and information
exchange systems, as well as robust electronic defense
for our own troops.
Moreover, even now it is advisable to make an effort to develop advanced electronic weapons—electronic warfare systems based on new physical principles. Integrated development of reconnaissance,
communications, navigation, identification and electronic warfare systems and their deep integration on
the basis of automated command and control systems
will allow, in the opinion of experts, a unified system
of intelligence and information support for the land
forces to be created, which will significantly improve
the effectiveness of combat operations in an information warfare environment. As for firepower, the fact is
that, as mentioned earlier, the aim of their development
should be to equip the land forces with highly efficient, long-range high-precision weapons and ammunition that make for dependable firepower to engage
the enemy deep in the zones for which the groups of
forces or troops are responsible in a strategic direction
up to 500-km; at the level of operational commands
between 150-170-km; and at brigade level 50-70-km.
Along with this, due attention should be given to improving the rate of fire of rocket and artillery systems,
the yield and armor piercing capability of ammunition, the working conditions of crews, survivability,
automation of processes to prepare for fire and to fire,
and the capability quickly to replenish ammunition.
The saturation of the land forces with high-precision
weapons that are used in a single reconnaissance and
information environment will allow combined-arms
formations in the future to act as reconnaissance and
strike systems that provide the capability to gain and
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maintain information and fire superiority over the enemy in a timely fashion, and, under favorable conditions, its defeat in the initial or subsequent phases of
military conflict on any scale.
It follows from this that the main requirement for
the development and production of weapons and
military equipment for the land forces is to provide not
just separate, albeit very effective, models but complete
functional systems which, along with weapons systems, include appropriate support systems: reconnaissance, communications, navigation, automated
command and control, camouflage and concealment,
electronic and information warfare, integrated protection, identification and others, up to and including training simulators. In our view, only this approach will be able to bring the level of equipment
in the land forces to a whole new level, to match
the nature and content of modern warfare. Thus,
the land forces continue to play a significant role in
Russia’s military security. The ongoing set of activities aimed at their development should lead to a substantial increase in the combat capabilities of military
formations and the development of advanced forms
and methods of warfare.
The earth’s surface is still the main sphere of human activity today and will be for the foreseeable
future. Military conflicts arise as a rule because of
“earthly” problems: territorial disputes; striving to
gain control over natural resources; redistribution
of spheres of influence; or political, ideological, religious, and other differences. Given the vastness of
Russia and the length of its land borders, it is obvious
that it is simply impossible to safeguard the defense
capability of the Russian state without extensive use
of the land forces. They are a versatile and multifunc-
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tional armed service of the armed forces; their military
formations are able to take control of areas and lines
of defense and hold them for a long time in order to
consolidate their success definitively. That is to say, as
“territorial presence” forces, the land forces continue
to play a decisive role in the defeat of the enemy and
the achievement of the objectives of military action
even under today’s new conditions. Yes, they do it
in cooperation with other armed services and service
arms of the armed forces, but other armed services
and service arms of the armed forces tend to act in the
interests of the land forces.
ENDNOTE - DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS
FOR LAND FORCES
1. “Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 28
декабря 2010 г. N 390-ФЗ “О безопасности’” (Federal Law of the
Russian Federation No. 390-FZ of December 28, 2010), available at
www.rg.ru/2010/12/29/bezopasnost-dok.html.
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DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR
LAND FORCES
APPENDIX
VIEWS OF FOREIGN MILITARY ANALYSTS
The American commanders have in recent years
significantly re-evaluated the role of the land forces
in any future war and consider them one of the most
important armed services of the armed forces, as only
they can close in with the enemy and engage it in combat or an operation, and capture and hold important
strategic areas. Therefore, all-sided action is being
taken to enhance their combat capabilities, firepower
and strike capability, and mobility and maneuverability on the battlefield, for which they are being supplied with the most advanced weapons and military
equipment, the structure of their formations is being
improved, and new principles of their operational use
are being developed.
The U.S. command attaches special importance to
helicopter gunships, intended to engage mobile armored targets, especially tanks. Serious attention is
being accorded to the modernization of anti-tank helicopter subunits as part of the U.S. Army in Europe.
In the experience of military exercises, helicopters can
destroy tanks from low altitude at ranges of up to 5
kilometers (km), with a ratio of up to 15:1 between
tanks and helicopters destroyed. According to foreign
experts, at this ratio of losses the available quantity of
American helicopter gunships in Europe is, it is said,
equivalent to having 3,500 tanks.
In the view of the leading American experts from
the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War
College, in the 21st century the land forces have an
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important place in the structure of the armed forces. Studies by the combat training command of this
armed service under the special project “Land Forces
of the Future” have four main elements: the likely
geopolitical changes and realities, the behavior of people and organizations, the development of the art of
war, and the impact of technological progress. Experts
believe that the main goal of the United States, which
is the only nation involved in nearly all of the affairs of
other nations throughout the globe, is to get the most
out of peaceful coexistence and to minimize periods
of armed conflict. In the opinion of the American
leadership, a key role in bringing this about belongs
to the Army, whose further development is grounded on a number of external and internal factors. The
former include:
•	
weapons of mass destruction and high-tech
proliferation, which increase the potential of
ambitious leaders and groups;
•	the use of terrorism by states to achieve national objectives;
•	an increase in the number of transnational challenges and the growing integration of the international community;
•	
the cyclical nature of development, with alternating periods of violence and relative
stability;
•	the general instability of the situation in the
medium-development and underdeveloped
countries, aggravated by possible tensions between highly developed nations; and,
•	the formation, under the influence of growing
international integration, of different communities and national enclaves within states, that
will require extra efforts in order to secure their
support for U.S. military action.
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The internal factors that will affect the development of the land forces, according to U.S. experts,
include the following:
•	changing attitudes among the American public
to threats to U.S. national interests as much reduced and insignificant; and,
•	the negative attitude of the political leaders and
public opinion to lengthy or costly military operations except when U.S. national interests are
under threat.
According to American experts, several problems
will have to be solved in order to select the optimal
strategy for the development of the land forces in
view of the factors noted earlier. First, the modernization strategy to be chosen will have to be of the kind
that will minimize the risks associated with a variety
of threats. This implies that if the international situation is relatively favorable, the land forces will be able
to expend a minimum amount of resources on longterm modernization and development. If, on the other
hand, the world will be dominated by conflicts, the
United States should focus on rapid development and
modernization of its land forces. The country’s current
strategy should, according to analysts, be adjusted
somewhat to reflect the threats likely to occur soon.
Second, the combat effectiveness of the land forces needs to be maximized, as they remain relatively
small in number and have to perform major largescale tasks. One way to increase their effectiveness is
to form international coalitions. Another is through
the introduction of new technologies. The latter assumes greater return, but also requires significant
financial investment. In addition, as noted by military experts, staking on the widespread use of tech-
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nological innovations is fraught with negative consequences. In particular, it can lead to existing high-cost
technology being prematurely retired. It is also possible that the probable adversary could find cheaper
countermeasures.
Third, the land forces will have to decide whether
the conduct of war is their sole function or just one of
many (albeit the most important). The boundaries that
have been drawn historically for the use of the army
could be expanded as the concept of national security
changes. Today, it includes the protection of national
assets and information systems, the environment and
public health. The view of American researchers,
however, is that it is necessary for the leadership of
the land forces to decide whether to take on new tasks
or to focus on one or two of them and to delegate the
rest to other agencies.
Fourth, the further development of the land forces
requires public support, which will allow funding to
continue at the appropriate level, as well as the required number of personnel to be maintained. In this
context, the command will have to constantly and
persistently explain the importance of the land forces
and their role in curbing violence, protection from
aggression, support for allies and friendly countries,
and help in the elimination of armed conflicts. The
strategic assessment of the role of the land forces until 2020 is that, most probably, the land forces will be
involved in action in the event of regional conflicts,
provide humanitarian assistance, and participate in
the fight against terrorism and guerrilla groups in urban and rural areas. They can also be used in combat
operations in the coastal zone and in the defense of the
continental United States.
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The view of U.S. military theorists is that the land
forces of the 21st century should differ significantly
from the army of the 1980s and early-1990s, primarily
as a number of technical innovations, mainly in the
sphere of information technology, will enter service.
These forces will be a more flexible strategic force capable of winning a decisive victory on the battlefield
as they maneuver and deliver effective and accurate
fire. In the first half of the 21st century, U.S. Army
formations and units will continue to be stationed
in Korea, Japan, and Western Europe, although their
numerical strength may be reduced. Improvements to
the structure of organization and establishment also
assume changes to the ratio of the active and reserve
components of the land forces.
Two options are being proposed:
1. the first is to retain only the powerful combat
units as active and to move secondary units to the
reserve; and,
2. the second is to move the major combat units
to the reserve and to include forces more suited to
modern conditions for the use of military force (operations during local military conflicts) in the active
component.
Currently, the U.S. land forces are in the process of
evolutionary development, as they are saturated with
computer and information technologies. The army of
the “day after tomorrow,” which should emerge in the
21st century as a result of a “revolution in military affairs,” will be a qualitatively new formation. The land
forces of the “day after tomorrow” are most likely to
be composed of this kind of numerically small units
and formations capable of quick redeployment from
one point of the globe to another in order to deliver
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short-duration and pinpoint strikes without bulky
combat support. A small number of larger subunits
will remain for peacekeeping operations.
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